This study attempts to identify whether government ownership has an effect on corporate performance, such as Return on Assets (ROA), Price to Book value, and Profits for a sample of 102 listed companies on the UAE stock exchanges and a subsample of 17 banks listed on the same bourses over a period of 31 quarters. In the case of the sample of 102 companies, government ownership has a positive impact on some of the corporate performance indicators, as well in the banking subsample. In addition, the analysis evaluates the impact of state ownership on debt accumulated across the two samples. The results indicate that state ownership reduced the need to accumulate debt in general across the larger sample. However, focusing on banks, state ownership facilitates borrowing and accumulating debt. The results point to the positive effect of state ownership on corporate performance. Further, state ownership eases constraints on banks' borrowing as it boosts confidence in the outlook, facilitating higher ratings and cheaper sources of funding. In the case of the UAE, similar to some other countries, where there is a strong trend toward government ownership in listed companies and banks, it has a positive effect on their performance for the period 2008-2016, i. e., there is a positive relationship between the block-holder ownership and firms' performance, subject to efficiency control measures.
Introduction
In the past two decades, attention has increased regarding firm ownership in relation to performance, an issue that took the fore following a series of recent financial and economic shocks occurring around the world.
1 There has been much debate on the effect of government ownership on firms' performance. On the one hand, state ownership brings a 'helping hand', which assumes that the higher the proportion of state ownership in a firm, the more capital subsidy is provided by the government. On the other hand, state ownership is supposed to bring a 'grabbing hand', which assumes that the government will extract more of the firm's profit as a result of its ownership to the benefit of politicians and bureaucrats (Tian and Estrin, 2008) .
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 will give a background on the literature review and Section 3 will explain the theoretical background of the current paper. Section 4 provides data description and sources. Section 5 provides the empirical framework, while Section 6 delivers a summary and policy implications.
suggests that in the U.S. government ownership has had a negative impact on firms' performance in general, while in Western Europe and Asia it is the opposite.
Research often shows a negative relationship between state ownership and firm performance. Thomsen, Pedersen, and Kvist (2006) find that there are two types of systems, including market-based systems and control-based systems. The market-based systems have a dispersion of share ownership among institutions, individuals and other investors. In contrast, the control-based systems have high concentration of family, corporate, or state ownership. The study interestingly finds that while the block-holder ownership has no impact on firm value in the market-based systems, there is a negative relationship between the block-holder ownership and firm value in the control-based systems. Andres (2008) finds evidence that state ownership has a negative effect on firm performance (approximated by accounting measures). The paper suggests that representatives of state ownership at firms may act for their own benefits, not for the state's benefits.
On the other hand, state ownership may have a positive effect on firm performance due to its advantages. Borisova et al. (2012) argue that state ownership has plenty of advantages, such as resources and power, compared to other types of ownership. For example, the government may raise fund easily, can establish regulations that target specific firms, and has informational advantage. Thus, firms with state ownership may have better performance compared to other firms. In addition, Kang and Kim (2012) find that Chinese state-owned firms improve firms' performance. This result reveals that state ownership in listed firms may play an active role in emerging markets.
These results imply that state ownership in the UAE could have different influence on the corporate performance compared to other transition or emerging economies. Indeed, empirical studies show mixed results of the relationship between state ownership and firm performance.
In the context of the UAE, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are a major contributor to GDP and employment (around 80 % for the GDP, as well as for employment according to Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operations (ADCO) study dated 2014). There are many reasons why the country has decided to have SOEs. SOEs, such as Etisalat (a telecommunication operator), are prominent forces in strategic sectors of the economy where the government wants to play a key role. When it comes to the long-term success of the country, the government is a patient investor that does not look for quick wins. Instead, the government usually couples commercial objectives with social objectives that do not pay return on investment in the short-term, but they ensure the country's sustainable development, especially in meeting the ever-increasing energy demand. SOEs such as Emirates Aluminum and Emirates Steel are major forces behind the government's steps to diversify the economy away from hydrocarbons.
Theoretical Background
Against this backdrop, the analysis will evaluate the impact of state ownership on the corporate performance indicators for companies listed on the two stock exchanges in the UAE, Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange, and Dubai Financial Market.
The potential for state ownership to serve as an effective monitor has flourished by the capacity and strategic objectives of state ownership, which has helped progress in developing capital markets in the UAE. As such, the markets are not mature and deep enough and therefore information problems could arise in the absence of market signals that usually work more effectively in a well-functioning capital market. As potentially dominant shareholder, the theory suggests the state is in a position to monitor management, or as Lin et al. (1998) suggest they may prevent "the expansion of managerial autonomy of SOEs which will worsen agency problems."
The theory tested in the paper is that the control-based systems, in this case the state ownership, has a positive effect on the firms' performance in the case of the UAE. In other words, there is a positive relationship between the block-holder ownership and firms' performance in the control-based systems.
Data Description and Sources
The firm data under consideration are for the period Q3 2008 to Q1 2016, with listings on one of the UAE's stock markets, the ADX (Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange), and the DFM (Dubai Financial Market). Our panel data consist of 102 listed firms, out of which 17 local commercial banks, with quarterly observations. The data are from the Bloomberg database, which contains financial performance and accounting data for nearly all of the listed firms in the UAE. The variables of interest are mainly government ownership, total debt, profits, price to book value, firm revenue, firm net cash flow, total assets, time listed since 2008 Q2 (in number of quarters), a variable indicating whether the company is listed on the DFM or not, leverage and return on assets.
The analysis will test whether and how state ownership impacts debt and the other indicators of firm performance in the UAE for the whole sample of companies and for the subsample of the 17 UAE commercial banks.
Below is a representation of the state ownership per stock exchange and for the two samples: all 102 companies and for the 17 listed local commercial banks.
The total market capitalization of all companies as at the end of Q1 2016 for all listed companies in the UAE is USD 209.6bn. For the 102 listed companies for which data are available to use in this paper market capitalization is more than USD 190bn and for the local commercial banks, it is USD 81.7bn. Hence, by studying the 102 companies, the analysis captures more than 90 % of the current market capitalization on the stock markets of the UAE.
In total, we have 3162 firm-quarter observations for all the listed companies included in the study and 527 firm-quarter observations for the listed local banks.
Graphical illustration in Figures 1 through 4 establishes that return on assets (ROA) and price to book value have different characteristics based on whether they are state owned or not (data as of 31st March 2016).
From the figures above, there is a difference in the levels, distribution and dispersion of the state-owned entities and those with less than 50 % government ownership. For instance, the mean and standard deviation are different for the subsamples with majority state ownership and those where the government has less than 50 % of the share. More descriptive statistics and distribution charts could be found in the Appendix ( Figure 5 to Figure 20) . In order to remove outliers, all data in the interval [m-2σ, m + 2σ] where m is the mean and σ is the standard deviation were kept and data points outside the interval observations were dropped for all variables.
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On average, the subsample with predominant state ownership has higher mean for the different indicators, with exception for the price to book value, for all listed companies/local banks. Hence, is the motivation to further investigate whether there is a difference in entities' performance according to their state ownership status. 
Assumptions and Empirical Models
The UAE stock markets have relatively high state ownership. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate the effect of state ownership on the firm performance and level of debt in listed companies and local commercial banks in the UAE. Specifically, the analysis will focus on the following hypotheses:
H1: Ceteris paribus, state ownership has a positive relationship with profit of listed firms/banks in the UAE. H2: Ceteris paribus, state ownership has a positive relationship with price to book value of listed firms/banks in the UAE.
H3: Ceteris paribus, state ownership has a positive relationship with return on assets of listed firms/banks in the UAE.
In addition, we would like to test whether the government ownership has an impact on the amount of outstanding debt for the different companies/banks. As seen in the Selected Issues paper, IMF UAE Staff Report, August 2016, in the case of government owned enterprises debt tends to be less than in the case of privately owned companies. The need for borrowing decreases due to financing by the majority owners, i. e., the Government. Hence, the following assumption is under consideration for the overall sample: H4 1 : Ceteris paribus, state ownership has a negative relationship with the outstanding debt of listed firms in the UAE.
On the other hand, in the case of banks in the UAE, as a fact, rating agencies include in their assessment the government support to banks as a major positive factor. High ratings of the majority owned banks by the local governments boost sources of funding for banks, enabling them to access cheaper funds on the interbank market or through issuance of bonds in the international market. The percentage ownership by the Government, in general, reflects positively on banks' ratings, which increases the prospects of securing outside funding. Hence, the following assumption is under consideration for the banks' sample: H4 2 : Ceteris paribus, state ownership has a positive relationship with the outstanding debt of listed banks in the UAE.
Analysis of the Variables
All the variables used in the analysis are stationary, based on the Unit Root Test results.
3 Correlation matrix reveals small and insignificant correlations across variables, implying no multi-collinearity in the regressions. 
Empirical Models

I) Overall sample
To test the hypotheses under investigation, the econometric models follow the specifications below. For H1 for the overall sample, the equation for profit is as follows:
State ownership is a variable that takes the values of 0, if the state ownership is below 50 %, 1 if it is between 50 % and 75 %, and 2 if it is above 75 %, Cash flow is the net income for the company, Debt to equity is a measure of leverage, time listed is the number of quarters the company has been listed on the stock exchange since 2008. The structural break dummy takes the value of 0 for the period 2008 Q3 to 2009 Q2 and 1 otherwise, as the Chow tests (structural break test) prove there is a regime shift in 2009 Q3 which coincides with the severity of the financial crisis in the UAE. DFM is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is listed on the DFM and 0 if it is listed on the ADX. it is the error term. More details on the definition of the variables are in Table  11 in the Appendix. After a verification with Hausman test, 5 we use a Random effect regression and the output is as follows: The results of the test for normality and cross section dependence of the residuals confirm the quality of the specification of the regression equation.
6 Table 3 illustrates the results of estimating the empirical model in (1). The results are consistent with expectations. Profits increase with the company's cash flow, sales and assets. Moreover, government ownership differentiates profits across companies as the amount earned increases with the Government's ownership share. Higher leverage decreases profits as evident by the negative and significant coefficient. In addition, if the company is listed on the ADX it would be more profitable than if it is listed on the DFM, differentiating firms' performance between the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai.
Hence, we do not reject H1 in the case of the overall sample, i.e., ceteris paribus, state ownership has a positive effect, increasing profits of listed firms in the UAE.
To test H2 across the full sample of companies, the equation for price to book value is as follows:
Following a verification of the specification using Hausman test, 7 the results of the Random effect regression are as follows: Table 4 illustrates the results of estimating the empirical model in (2). Test results for normality and cross section dependence test of the residuals confirm the quality of the regression equation.
8
Price to Book value increases across companies over time with the company's sales and cash flow. Price to book value decreases with size as evident by the negative and significant coefficient on assets. The coefficient on the structural break dummy indicates reduction in price to book value following the financial crisis. Further, price to book value decreases the longer the company has been listed on the stock exchange. However, government ownership does not have an impact, as evident by the insignificant variable (P-value higher than 5 %), on the dependent variable in the panel sample.
Hence, we do reject H2 in the case of the overall sample, i.e. ceteris paribus, state ownership does not have a positive relationship with price to book value for listed firms in the UAE.
To test H3 for the overall sample, the equation for ROA value is as follows:
The estimation method used for the regression is pooled data. The output of the regression is as follows: Test results for normality and cross section dependence test of the residuals confirm the quality of the specification for the regression equation. Table 5 illustrates the results of estimating the empirical model in (3). The results indicate that return on assets increase with sales but decrease with leverage, i. e., the ratio of debt relative to the company's equity. In addition, the size of the company, as measured by its assets, has a negative effect on return to assets. The results are robust regarding the impact of government ownership on indicators of performance, as measured by return on assets in this regression. Similar to the evidence of the price to book value, return on assets decreases with the time since listing. As there is evidence of structural break around the financial crisis, return on assets has not fully recovered since, resulting in a negative effect of time listed on return on assets across companies over time. Moreover, companies listed on the Abu Dhabi exchange market are better performers compared to those listed on the Dubai exchange.
Hence, we do not reject H3 in the case of the overall sample, i.e., ceteris paribus, state ownership has a positive relationship with return on assets of listed firms in the UAE.
To test H4 1 for the overall sample, the equation for the debt is represented as follows:
The estimation method used for the regression is pooled data. The output of the regression is as follows:
The results of the tests for normality and cross section dependence test of the residuals confirm the quality of the specification of the regression equation.
10 Table 6 illustrates the results of estimating the empirical model in (4). The results confirm expectations. Government ownership has a negative and significant effect on the amount of debt the companies acquire over time. However, the debt value increases with the size of assets, sales and leverage. Companies in Dubai, i. e., on DFM are more indebted compared to those listed on the Abu Dhabi exchange market. The collective evidence indicates that higher sales and assets have positive effects on ratings and the ability to finance companies by issuing debt.
Hence, we do not reject 4 1 in the case of the overall sample, i.e. ceteris paribus, state ownership has a negative relationship with the outstanding debt of listed firms in the UAE.
II) Banks' sample
To test the hypotheses under investigation across the sample of listed banks, the econometric models are as follows:
To test H1 for the banks sample, the equation for profit is as follows:
To verify the model estimation, the Hausman test 11 results confirm the Random effect regression specification. The evidence is as follows:
Test results for normality and cross section dependence of the residuals confirm the quality of the specification of the regression equation.
12 Table 7 illustrates the results of estimating the empirical model in (5). The more cash flow and revenues banks have, the higher is their profit. If banks are listed on the ADX, they are more likely to have higher profit than if they are listed on the DFM. In the smaller sample of banks, the coefficient for the government ownership is significant. However the sign of the assets is negative and significant. 13 Higher leverage decreases banks' profitability. In addition, the longer banks have been listed on the stock exchange the higher their profitability is.
Hence, we do not reject H1 in the case of the banks' sample, i.e. ceteris paribus, state ownership has a positive relationship with profit of listed banks in the UAE.
To test H2 for the banks' sample, the equation for price to book value is as follows:
The test for normality and cross section dependence test of the residuals confirm the specification of the regression equation.
14 Table 8 illustrates the results of estimating the empirical model in (6). The results indicate that the Price to Book value decreases with the size of assets across banks over time. There is significant evidence of structural break, implying that the price to book value has decreased significantly for banks post the financial crisis. Banks listed on the ADX tend to have higher Price per Book value than if they are listed on the DFM. However, the coefficient for the variable government ownership remains insignificant. The implication being the share of government ownership across the banks under investigation does not provide significant evidence that differentiates the Price to Book value over time.
Hence, we reject H2 in the case of the banks' sample, i.e., ceteris paribus, state ownership does not have a positive relationship with the price to book value of listed banks in the UAE.
To test H3 across the banks sample, the equation for ROA value is represented as follows:
After verification of the estimation model using the Hausman test, 15 the estimation results of the Random effect regression are as follows:
Tests for normality and cross section dependence test of the residuals confirm that the quality of the specification of the regression equation.
16 Table 9 illustrates the results of estimating the empirical model in (7) The results indicate that higher leverage, higher debt to the bank's equity, has a negative and significant effect on return on assets across banks over time. Return on assets decreases with the banks' assets, but increases with sales. Time listed since 2008 matters to increase return on assets across banks, an evidence of the positive effect of banks' maturity on performance. The structural break dummy indicates significant reduction in return on assets across banks over time post the financial crisis. Dubai listed banks have lower returns on assets compared to those listed in Abu Dhabi.
The coefficient for the variable Government ownership is positive and significant, providing further evidence that the share of government ownership is significant to improve performance across banks over time in the sample under consideration.
Hence, we do not reject H3 in the case of the banks' sample, i.e. ceteris paribus, state ownership has a positive relationship on the return on assets of listed banks in the UAE.
To test H4 2 across the banks' sample, the equation for the debt is represented as follows:
The estimation method used for the regression is pooled data. The output of the regression is as follows: Tests for normality and cross section dependence test of the residuals confirm the quality of the specification of the regression equation.
17 Table 10 illustrates the results of estimating the empirical model in (8). The evidence indicates that the amount of debt increases across banks over time with cash flow, leverage, and sales. Hence, stronger banking fundamentals increase ratings and solidify the ability to borrow to raise funds by banks. Borrowing decreases over time the longer the bank has been listed. In this connection, it is interesting to note that government ownership improves banks' ratings and therefore solidifies fundamentals that enable banks to raise funds by borrowing, as evident by the positive effect of the share of government ownership on the size of debt banks hold over time. The amount of debt increased significantly across all banks post the financial crisis, an evidence that supports improved management and efforts to clean up bad loans post the crisis.
Hence, we do not reject 4 2 in the case of the banks' sample, i.e., ceteris paribus, state ownership has a positive relationship on the outstanding debt of listed banks in the UAE.
Summary and Policy Implications
As publicly owned shareholders increase, SOEs have better insider information about the firm that is not widely available. Since the state usually holds shares over long periods of time they have the authority to engage in extensive and ongoing information gathering that matter for the firm's operations, thus further reducing information problems and improving the corporate performance.
The evidence across listed companies under investigation confirms the positive effects of government ownership on most of the indicators of performance, as measured by return on assets, profit earned and price to book value, with the effect being confirmed for ROA and profits earned. Consistently, better performance indicators have reduced the need for financing by companies the higher the share of government in ownership.
The evidence across banks presents an identical scenario. It appears that Government ownership plays also an important role in solidifying better performance of the listed banks. In addition, ownership matters as it has increased confidence in the stability of banks, enabling them to enjoy higher ratings and access to finance, compared to other banks where government ownership does not constitute a dominant share.
The results for the firms' performance in the UAE are in line with the findings of Borisova et al. (2012) and Kang and Kim (2012) , reviewing the impact of government ownership in Europe and China respectively, where the state ownership has also a positive effect on selected performance indicators of listed enterprises.
This study confirms the theory that when there is a control-based system, in this case state ownership, it has a positive effect on the firms' performance. It verifies the validity of the theoretical implications by showing that in the case of the UAE, firms' performance indicators are impacted positively in a controlled system managed by state ownership. Performance is further solidified by access to capital which decreases the debt levels and the associated cost of debt service to optimal levels.
At the macro level, it is important to evaluate the optimal ownership structure in order to judge the prospects of growing economic activity and inducing better indicators of performance by resorting to restructuring of existing corporates, if necessary. This assessment is important for the UAE economy that has surpassed its regional comparators in terms of economic diversification and positioned itself on the path for further diversification to celebrate the last barrel of oil.
At the core of growing non-energy sectors is establishing the right structure of corporate ownership to achieve the best performance results. The results attest that the role of government ownership has improved companies' performance, having access to sufficient capital, with less need for borrowing. Across banks, government ownership has solidified confidence in the stability of the banks, enabling them to enjoy good ratings to enlarge the pool of funding for their intermediation and credit support for the non-energy sector of the economy.
In addition, the analysis sheds light on what is missing to improve corporate performance at the aggregate level. If state ownership helps performance, advantages may include improved management, support, and accountability, which have reflected positively on performance indicators. Future research should complement this evidence by evaluating the impact of government ownership on productivity and contributions of the corporate sector, including banks, to the macro economy.
The results will shed further light on the UAE's experience and inform economic management in similar economies of the MENA region, particularly resource-rich countries. Ownership structure, structural reforms and improved regulations should lead the process to attain a higher degree of diversification going forward as oil-rich countries adjust to the new norm of the oil price and focus their attention on the best formula of private/public partnership and corporate ownership to aid their reform agenda for further diversification and sustainable growth. → Stationary series 
Appendix
AS-SETS BREAK CASH-FLOW DEBT DEBT_TO_EQ-UITY DFM GOV_OWN-ER-SHIP
P_B_VALUE PROFITROA SALES TIME_LISTED
ASSETS 100 % BREAK 0 % 100 % CASHFLOW 12 % 6 % 100 % DEBT 17 % −2 % 9 % 100 % DEBT_TO_EQ-UITY 5 % −2 % −2 % 58 % 100 % DFM 0 % −1 % −2 % 21 % 9 % 100 % GOV_OWNER-SHIP 17 % 1 % −5 % −4 % −12 % −2 % 100 % P_B_VALUE −2 % −18 % 2 % 2 % 6 % −3 % −2 % 100 % PROFIT 25 % 4 % 29 % 44 % 5 % 2 % −4 % 4 % 100 % ROA −8 % −14 % 4 % −12 % −20 % −10 % → Normally distributed → Normally distributed → Normally distributed → Normally distributed → Normally distributed → Normally distributed 
Notes
1 See, e.g., Alfaraih et al. (2012) , Ang et al. (2000) , Benson and Davidson (2009), Berger and Ofek (1995) , Chen and Ho (2000) , Cho (1998) , , Coles et al. (2012) , Dharwadkar et al. (2000) , Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Kim (2011) , Lemmon and Lins (2003) , and Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) . 2 m represents the variable arithmetic mean and σ its standard deviation across the sample. 3 More details could be found in the Appendix, Table 12, Table 13, Table 14, Table 15, Table 16, Table 17, Table 18, Table 19, Table 20, Table  21, Table 22, Table 23, Table 24, Table 25 , Table 26 and Table 27 .
4 Please refer to Table 28 and Table 29 in the Appendix. 5 Details of the test are in Table 30 in the Appendix. 6 For more details, please see Figure 21 and Table 34 in the Appendix. 7 For more details, please see Table 31 in the Appendix. 8 For more details, please see Figure 22 and Table 35 in the Appendix. 9 For more details, please see Figure 23 and Table 36 in the Appendix. 10 For more details, please see Figure 24 and Table 37 in the Appendix. 11 For more details please look at Table 32 in the Appendix. 12 For more details, please look at Figure 25 and Table 38 in the Appendix. 13 The analysis was done of the same regression, excluding State ownership, and the results indicate that assets had a positive and significant sign. Hence, government ownership serves as a proxy for higher assets. 14 For more details, please see Figure 26 and Table 39 in the Appendix. 15 For more details, please see Table 33 in the Appendix. 16 For more details please look at Figure 27 and Table 40 in the Appendix. 17 For more details, please see Figure 28 and Table 41 in the Appendix.
